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Abstract
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency pro-
gram. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the
degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but
so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits
against higher expected fines. If firms are sufficiently patient, leniency
is ineffective; it may even increase collusion. Increasing the probability
of an investigation at low levels does not increase deterrence. Increas-
ing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion,
yet never completely.
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1 Introduction
A corporate leniency program reduces the sanctions for self-reporting car-
tel members. In 1993 the US Department of Justice revised its Corporate
Leniency Program, committing itself to the lenient prosecution of the first
confessor. It allows amnesty to be awarded even when an investigation has
already been started. This revision is considered as the most significant pol-
icy innovation in antitrust. It substantially increased the number of detected
and convicted cartels. The apparent success led the EU to adopt its own
leniency program in 1996. Other countries followed suit.1
The literature on leniency typically assumes that firms either fully collude
or they do not collude at all: they set, for example, either the monopoly or
the competitive price. In this paper we give up this binary choice. Our
firms choose the degree of collusion—a continuous variable. They may, e.g.,
pick the fraction of markets on which they collude; or they may set any
price between the competitive and the monopoly one.2 Firms’ profits are
increasing in the degree of collusion, yet so is the probability of detection:
the more markets firms collude on, the higher is the probability that the
antitrust authority (AA) finds out the illegal behavior once it opened an
investigation. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against higher expected
fines.
Legislation specifies the fine and full leniency for the first reporting firm.
The fine is proportional to the degree of collusion. The AA picks the probabil-
ity with which it starts an investigation. For each probability of investigation
we determine the corresponding degree of collusion.
We consider two collusive strategies which differ in firms’ behavior in case
of an investigation. Either firms do not reveal the illegal behavior once an
investigation started; they make the collusive profits, yet both firms pay the
fine when detected. Or firms exploit leniency: if the AA opens an investiga-
tion, they simultaneously reveal and stop collusion during the investigation;
1See, e.g., Harrington and Chang (2009), Spagnolo (2008), or Harrington (2017).
2For example, in the Swiss construction bid-rigging cartels, firms colluded on some
projects and declared others open for competition. See www.weko.admin.ch/aktuell/
00162/index.html?lang=fr....
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both firms then have a 50% chance of receiving leniency. Firms continue
collusion after the agreed upon reporting.
First we show that if firms are sufficiently patient, leniency does not
increase deterrence. Either firms collude and do not reveal in case of an
investigation: then the incentive to report the cartel and get leniency is too
small for patient firms. Or firms collude and reveal in case of an investigation:
then firms actually collude on all markets.
Next we look at the degree of collusion as a function of the probability
of an investigation. If an investigation is unlikely, firms collude and reveal
in case of an investigation. Under this strategy firms collude on all markets.
Increasing the probability of an investigation does not lower the degree of
collusion. By contrast, if an investigation is sufficiently likely, firms collude
and do not report in case of an investigation. Here the degree of collusion
decreases with the probability of an investigation. Nevertheless, firms always
choose a positive degree of collusion. The fine is proportional to the degree of
collusion. Slightly colluding has no first-order effect on the fine, yet it raises
profits.
Leniency thus produces mixed results in our set-up. With patient firms it
has no bite and is, therefore, redundant. Moreover, it opens the door for the
strategy collude and reveal in case of an investigation which, in turn, goes
together with full collusion. Firms actually play this strategy for low prob-
abilities of investigation. Thus, in this case leniency induces full collusion.
More statements about the effectiveness of leniency are not possible without
further specifying the model. Yet, our set-up generates another message. As
long as the fine is proportional to the degree of collusion, firms will always
collude: a small increase in the degree of collusion has no first-order effect
on the expected fine but a positive first-order effect on profits.
Two of our results do not hold if firms can only choose between no and full
rather than from a continuum of degrees of collusion: First, that leniency has
no bite with patient firms and second, that there is always some collusion.
The assessment of the efficacy of leniency thus depends on the degree of
collusion firms can choose from.
Our paper builds on the analysis of leniency programs by Motta and Polo
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(2003), Spagnolo (2003), Aubert et al. (2006), and Harrington (2008).3 This
literature analyzes the effects of leniency on the frequency of collusion and
derives optimal fine structures.
Our basic set-up is close to Motta and Polo (2003). Besides in the degree
of collusion (binary versus continuous), our framework differs from theirs in
another respect: In Motta and Polo (2003) the AA chooses the probability
that it opens an investigation and the probability that it successfully con-
cludes the investigation. In our set-up the resources the AA puts into an
investigation are exogenously given. Firms determine by their choice of the
degree of collusion the probability that the investigation leads to a conviction.
The AA, in turn, chooses the probability of an investigation.
A few papers look at variable degrees of collusion, their focus is, however,
not on leniency. In Block et al. (1981) the probability of detection is an
increasing function of the price; in Harrington (2004, 2005) it increases with
the price change. In Bos et al. (2018) the probability of detection is a
non-decreasing function of price. It is positive even when firms charge the
competitive price and so is the fine. This means firms face a positive expected
fine at the competitive price. Therefore, cartels with low overcharges do not
form in the first place.4
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section describes
the model. In Section 3 we derive the equilibrium behavior of firms. In
Section 4 we derive our results on deterrence. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider two potentially colluding firms. The two firms face a continuum
of identical markets with mass 1. The firms can collude on each market.
More specifically, they choose the fraction ν ∈ [0, 1] of markets on which
3Further theoretical research includes Harrington and Chang (2009), Harrington (2013),
Sauvagnat (2015), and Harrington and Chang (2015); empirical and experimental research
includes Bigoni et al. (2012, 2015), Brenner (2009), and Miller (2009). For a survey, see
Harrington (2017).
4By contrast, Houba et al. (2010) assume like us that the probability of detection and
the fine is zero at the competitive price.
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they collude; ν thus measures the degree of collusion.5
The legislator specifies the antitrust framework that we take as exoge-
nously given. Within this framework the AA chooses its policy: it tries to
deter collusion. At the outset the legislator announces the fine F > 0 that
a convicted firm pays whenever it colluded with the other firm on a market
in the period under consideration. The legislator grants leniency to the first
reporting firm. To get leniency, the reporting firm has to provide evidence
of the conspiracy and it has to immediately stop the collusive conduct. If
both firms choose to report, nature determines with equal probability who
is first. Accordingly, in expectation each firm obtains half the leniency. We
look at the case of full leniency so that the reporting firm ends up with no
fine while the non-reporting firm pays F ; if both firms report, each of them
pays in expectation F/2. The fine is proportional to the degree of collusion.
Accordingly, if the firms collude on ν markets and are convicted, they pay a
fine νF .
The AA starts an investigation with probability α ∈ [0, 1]. An investiga-
tion leads with probability P to the detection and conviction of the cartel;
we will specify P as we move along.
Then an infinitely repeated game starts. The stage game in each period
t = 0, . . . has the following structure: Knowing α, first firm i, i = a, b,
decides whether it wants to communicate with the other firm or not. Firms
make this decision simultaneously. If both firms choose to communicate, they
create evidence that —if detected— leads to a conviction by the AA; unless
both firms communicate, they do not engage in illegal behavior and there is
thus no evidence thereof.6 The evidence dissolves at the end of the period.7
Next let us describe how firms collude. The two firms face a continuum
of identical markets. They choose the fraction ν ∈ [0, 1] of markets on which
they collude. If the firms do not collude on a market, they compete and
make profit 0. If they collude on a market by setting the monopoly price,
5Using our notation, most of the existing literature looks at the case where ν ∈ {0, 1}.
6The AA thus does not make type I errors, i.e., punish non-colluding firms. See, e.g.,
Block and Sidak (1980) for a discussion of antitrust enforcement when courts make errors.
7Communication, even when it is not followed by anti-competitive behavior, is consid-
ered illegal.
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they make profit πM each. Thus, if they collude on ν markets, each firm
makes profit νπM .
8
Firms support the collusive behavior with grim-trigger strategies. If a
firm deviates from collusion, Nash punishment, i.e., competition, starts and
continues forever; each firm makes the static Nash profit 0. If a firm deviates
while the other firm colludes, the deviating firm reaps the entire monopoly
profit 2νπM ; the colluding firm’s profit is 0.
9
The cartel is stable in the absence of the AA. If δ denotes the firms’
common discount rate, this means that πM/(1 − δ) > 2πM , or δ > 1/2:
getting πM forever is better than getting 2πM in the first round and from
then on nothing. Thus, we assume δ ∈ (1/2, 1).
Then the AA starts an investigation with probability α, leading to the
investigation subgame; with probability (1−α) the game continues with the
no-investigation subgame. In both subgames the firms choose whether they
adhere to collusion or whether they deviate. Simultaneously, the firms decide
whether they report any communication or not; firms make this decision
knowing whether an investigation is ongoing or not.
If there is an investigation, the firms’ choice of ν together with their
reporting behavior determines the probability of conviction,
P =
{
p(ν), if no firm reports;
1, if firm i reports, i = a, b, or both firms report.
If firms do not report, the probability of conviction depends on the number
of markets on which they collude. p(ν) ∈ [0, 1] with p(0) = 0, p′ > 0 for
ν > 0, and p′(1) finite. If firms do not collude on any market, the probability
of conviction is zero.10 The more markets the firms collude on, the higher
8Alternatively, suppose the two firms face one market with demand 1 − q where q is
the price. Normalizing the firms’ cost to zero, the monopoly price is qM = .5 and the
monopoly profit is .25, thus πM = .125. Bertrand competition leads to q = 0 along with
zero profits. If firms collude on prices, the choice of ν corresponds to setting the price
q = .5[1−
√
1− ν].
9In the Bertrand example firms fix prices: They set q = .5[1−
√
1− ν] and make profit
νπM . If a firm deviates, it slightly undercuts q. If firms compete, they both charge q = 0.
10If firms decide to communicate and then pick ν = 0, they engage in illegal behavior
that is sanctionable. Yet in our framework firms anticipate that they will choose ν = 0
and they will not communicate in the first place.
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is the probability of conviction. Furthermore, 2p′ + νp′′ > 0 to ensure the
existence of interior solutions for ν where appropriate. If one or both firms
report, the evidence of collusion is unveiled and the firms get convicted for
sure.11
Legislation stipulates the fine F as well as full leniency. The AA strives
to deter cartels.
To summarize the the model:
• The legislator determines the fine F and grants full leniency for the
first reporting firm; this antitrust framework is exogenously given.
• The AA announces α.
• Then the stage game begins:
– Firms decide whether they communicate or not.
– The AA starts an investigation with probability α, resulting in an
investigation or a no-investigation subgame.
– In both subgames firms choose whether to adhere to collusion or
not and whether they report or not.
– If firms communicated and there is an investigation, they are con-
victed with probability P .
– If firms communicated and there is no investigation, they are not
convicted if nobody reports. If a firm reports, they are convicted
with probability 1.
Firms maximize profits with respect to their communication, price, and
reporting decision. The AA chooses α. We analyze the firms’ behavior for
given levels of α.
11Firms thus possess perfect and symmetric evidence of the collusive behavior. See
Blatter et al. (2018) for a set-up where firms have imperfect and asymmetric evidence.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
Following the literature we consider two collusive strategies for firms.12 Both
these strategies differ in the firms’ behavior in the investigation subgame.
We will, therefore, identify the two strategies with their reporting strategy
in the investigation subgame:
• Firms agree to collude. In both, the no-investigation and the investi-
gation subgame, the firms adhere to collusion and do not report. Call
this strategy N .
• Firms agree to collude. In the no-investigation subgame they adhere
to collusion and do not report. In the investigation subgame firms stop
collusion and report. After an investigation with agreed upon report-
ing, firms continue to play the collusive strategy. Call this strategy
R.13
3.1 Collude and not reveal
Let us first consider strategy N under which firms never report collusion.
With probability (1 − α) there is no investigation. Firms collude and make
profit νπM . With probability α there is an investigation. Firms collude, make
profit νπM , and face the expected fine p(ν)νF . Next period firms continue
with collusion. The expected profit per period is
πN = ν[πM − αp(ν)F ] (1)
and the expected overall profit amounts to πN/(1− δ).
12See, e.g., Motta and Polo (2003).
13Collude when there is no investigation, report when there is an investigation, and stop
collusion after a report is clearly dominated by strategy R. Next consider the strategy
collude when there is no investigation; when there is an investigation, firm a reports while
firm b does not; stop collusion after a firm reported. In the investigation subgame both
firms play the static Nash equilibrium leading to zero profits. If firm b deviates to reporting,
it doesn’t change the probability of conviction, yet lowers its fine by half. Hence, it rather
reports. Both firms reporting in the investigation subgame without returning to collusion
thereafter is, however, dominated by strategy R.
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3.1.1 Without leniency
Let us first determine the firms’ choice of ν absent any leniency. Maximizing
(1) without any constraints yields
ν̄N = (πM/αF − p(ν̄N))/p′(ν̄N). (2)
Call ν̄N the unconstrained choice under strategy N . ν̄N is increasing with πM
and decreasing with α and F : If the AA increases α, the degree of collusion
goes down.14 For α and/or F sufficiently small, ν̄N > 1 so that ν ≤ 1 binds.
More importantly, note that increasing ν at ν = 0 has no first-order effect
on the expected fine while profits increase. Therefore, firms always choose a
positive degree of collusion, i.e., ν̄N > 0.
Next let us take the firms’ incentive constraint without leniency into ac-
count: In the investigation as well as in the no-investigation subgame a firm
must prefer to adhere to collusion rather than deviate for a onetime increase
in profit.
Suppose the AA has started an investigation so that we are in the inves-
tigation subgame. If firms continue to play N , their profit is ν[πM −p(ν)F +
δ(πM − αp(ν)F )/(1 − δ)]. If a firm deviates from collusion, it makes profit
2νπM−p(ν)νF : It gets the deviation profit minus the expected fine; however,
from next period on the firms compete and make no profits.
Suppose we are in the no-investigation subgame. If firms continue to play
N , their profit is ν[πM + δ(πM − αp(ν)F )/(1 − δ)]. If a firm deviates from
collusion, it makes profit 2νπM . Firms play N rather than report and deviate
in both, the investigation and the no-investigation subgame, if
ν[πM + δ(πM − αp(ν)F )/(1− δ)] ≥ 2νπM . (3)
To support N without leniency, firms choose the degree of collusion that
satisfies the equality in (3),
ν̃N = p
−1((2δ − 1)πM/δαF ). (4)
14For example, formally we have ∂ν̄N/∂α = −πM/α2F (2p′(ν̄N ) + ν̄Np′′(ν̄N )) < 0.
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3.1.2 With leniency
Consider now the situation with leniency. Suppose the AA has started an
investigation so that we are in the investigation subgame. If firms continue
to play N , their profit is ν[πM − p(ν)F + δ(πM − αp(ν)F )/(1 − δ)]. If a
firm reports and deviates from collusion, it makes profit 2νπM : It gets the
deviation profit and pays no fine; however, from next period on the firms
compete and make no profits. Firms play N rather than report and deviate
if
ν[πM − p(ν)F + δ(πM − αp(ν)F )/(1− δ)] ≥ 2νπM . (5)
To support N in the presence of leniency firms choose the degree of collusion
that satisfies the equality in (5). We have
ν̂N = p
−1((2δ − 1)πM/(1− δ + δα)F ). (6)
Call ν̂N the constrained choice under strategy N . ν̂N is increasing in πM
and decreasing in α and F . First note that, not surprisingly, ν̂N < ν̃N . The
introduction of leniency makes the deviation to not collude more attractive:
by not collude and report the firm gets the deviation profit and avoids the
fine F . Therefore, under strategy N firms choose either the unconstrained
ν̄N or the constrained degree of collusion ν̂N . Clearly, they do better with
ν̄N than ν̂N . Consequently, they will choose ν̂N only when it is smaller than
ν̄N . Taking into account that ν ∈ [0, 1], we have
ν∗N = min{ν̄N , ν̂N , 1}. (7)
Let us now state our first result. If firms are sufficiently patient, under
strategy N the incentive to deviate plays no role: it is not attractive to give
up the future profits from collusion for a onetime profit increase. By contrast,
if they are sufficiently impatient, the incentive to deviate alone determines
the degree of collusion.
Lemma 1:
a) For δ close to 1, ν̄N < ν̂N ∀α > 0;
b) for δ close to 1/2, ν̂N < ν̄N ∀α > 0.
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Proof: a) Rewrite (2) as p(ν̄N) = πM/αF − p′(ν̄N)ν̄N and (6) as p(ν̂N) =
(2δ−1)πM/(1−δ+δα)F . p(ν̂N) is increasing in δ and limδ↑1 p(ν̂N) = πM/αF .
For δ close to one, p(ν̂N) > p(ν̄N), because ν̄N > 0. Since p
′ > 0, ν̂N > ν̄N .
b) limδ↓1/2 p(ν̂N) = 0, hence ν̂N → 0 for δ approaching 1/2. Since ν̄N > 0,
we have ν̂N < ν̄N for δ close to 1/2. 
Note that part a) of Lemma 1 does not hold if we restrict ν ∈ {0, 1}.
Obviously, under this restriction the interior solution ν̄N does not exist. Let
α and F be, for example, such that for ν = 1 the equality in (3) is satisfied,
i.e., without leniency firms collude. Introducing leniency makes the deviation
from collusion more attractive so that (5) is not satisfied for ν = 1. In this
case leniency thus increases deterrence for all δ ∈ (1/2, 1).
3.2 Collude and reveal
Let us now turn to the strategy R. With probability (1 − α) there is no
investigation. Firms collude and make profit νπM . With probability α there
is an investigation. Firms report, stop collusion in this period by playing the
static Nash equilibrium, make 0 profit, and pay the fine νF/2. Next period
firms return to collusion. The expected profit per period is
πR = ν[(1− α)πM − αF/2] (8)
and the expected overall profit πR/(1− δ).
Now let us consider the incentive to deviate. In the investigation subgame
both firms report. A firm does not unilaterally deviate to not report because
the other firm reports: the fine it pays increases from F/2 to F without any
benefits whatsoever.
In the no-investigation subgame if firms play R, they collude and do not
report; their profit is ν[πM + δ((1−α)πM −αF/2)/(1− δ)]. If a firm reports
and deviates from collusion, it makes profit 2νπM : It gets the deviation profit
and pays no fine; however, from next period on the firms compete and make
no profits. Firms play R rather than report and deviate if
ν[πM + δ((1− α)πM − αF/2)/(1− δ)] ≥ 2νπM . (9)
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Hence,
νR =
{
0, α > πM(2δ − 1)/δ(F/2 + πM);
1, otherwise.
(10)
πR is linear in ν. Therefore, the optimal degree of collusion is either zero
or one.
4 Deterrence
Before we analyze when firms actually play N or R under leniency, we may
already state the following result: If firms are sufficiently patient, the intro-
duction of leniency does not decrease collusion.
Proposition 1: For δ close to one, leniency does not increase deterrence.
Proof: We know from Lemma 1 that ν̄N < ν̂N for δ close to 1. If ν̄N < 1,
firms choose the interior degree of collusion ν̄N . If ν̄N ≥ 1, firms collude on
all markets. In both cases the introduction of leniency does not change their
behavior as to strategy N .
Leniency introduces the option to play strategy R. Under strategy N
firms always make positive profits. Therefore, if firms prefer R to N , they
must fully collude on all markets. More than full collusion is not possible
under strategy N . Thus, collusion does not go down if firms switch from N
to R. 
We know from Lemma 1 that leniency has no bite as to strategy N if firms
are sufficiently patient; the degree of collusion is the same as without leniency.
Leniency opens the door for strategy R. If firms actually choose R, then
they fully collude. Therefore, if firms continue to play N , the introduction of
leniency does not change the degree of collusion. If firms switch to R, they
fully collude after the introduction of leniency. Collusion goes up if ν̄N < 1;
otherwise, it remains unchanged.
Proposition 1 implies that with sufficiently patient firms the introduction
of leniency is not a good idea. Given firms play collude and not reveal,
the option of getting leniency does not induce them to blow the whistle.
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Furthermore, leniency introduces the possibility to play collude and reveal.
If firms opt for this strategy, they collude on all markets.
Let us now determine the firms’ strategy choice as a function of α.
Proposition 2:
a) For α small and F ≥ πM/(p(1)− 1/2), firms play R and ν∗ = νR = 1;
b) for α > πM(2δ − 1)/δ(F/2 + πM), firms play N and ν∗ = ν∗N > 0.
Proof: a) If α small, ν̄N = 1 and πN(1) = πM − αp(1)F . ν̂N ≤ ν̄N and
πN(ν̂N) ≤ πN(ν̄N) because ν̄N is the unconstrained choice. For α small, νR =
1 and πR(1) = (1− α)πM − αF/2. πR(1) ≥ πN(1) if F ≥ πM/(p(1)− 1/2).
b) For α > πM(2δ − 1)/δ(F/2 + πM), νR = 0 and πR(0) = 0. ν∗N > 0 ∀α,
hence πR(ν
∗
N) > 0. 
If α is small, the firms’ unconstrained choice under strategy N is ν̄N = 1
and πN(1) = πM − αp(1)F . Taking the incentive to deviate into account
yields ν̂N ≤ ν̄N . The profit under the constrained choice cannot exceed the
profit under the unconstrained choice, thus πN(1) is the upper bound for
profits under strategy N . Under strategy R firms pick νR = 1 for α small,
leading to profit πR(1) = (1− α)πM − αF/2. R yields higher profits than N
if F ≥ πM/(p(1) − 1/2). Under R a firm gives up πM and pays F/2 in the
investigation subgame; under N it pays p(1)F in the investigation subgame.
Given p(1) > 1/2, for F sufficiently large firms prefer R.
For α > πM(2δ−1)/δ(F/2 +πM), firms do not collude under R which, in
turn, implies zero profits. Under strategy N there is always collusion leading
to positive profits. From Lemma 1 we know that for δ close to one, firms
choose the unconstrained ν̄N ; leniency has thus no bite. By contrast, for δ
close to 1/2, firms pick ν̂N : the degree of collusion is constrained by leniency.
For all other cases the firms’ choices cannot be determined without spec-
ifying the detection probability p(ν). Firms may play strategy N with the
unconstrained ν̄N or the constrained choice ν̂N , both of which are positive
for all α; or firms play strategy R with νR = 1. Yet, despite this vagueness,
we can make the following statement: Whatever detection probability α the
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AA chooses, firms will answer with a positive degree of collusion; complete
deterrence is not possible in our set-up.
Proposition 2 has the following policy messages. In case a) slightly in-
creasing α does not lower the degree of collusion: firms continue to collude
on all markets playing R. However, it increases cartel desistence, i.e., firms
interrupt their collusion more often and the AA collects the fine more often.
In case b) increasing α lowers the degree of collusion (though never to zero).
Whether the AA collects more fines is, however, unclear: α goes up, ν∗N goes
down, and so does the probability of detection p(ν∗N) and the fine ν
∗
NF .
As to the introduction of leniency, Proposition 2 implies the following.
For small values of α introducing leniency is not a good idea: firms may
switch from collude and not reveal with ν∗N < 1 to collude and reveal with
ν∗R = 1, i.e., collusion goes up. For large values of α firms choose collude and
not reveal. Suppose without leniency firms do not choose the unconstrained
degree of collusion, i.e., ν̃N < ν̄N with ν̃N given by (4). Then leniency
reduces collusion because it reinforces the incentive to deviate (ν̂N < ν̃N).
Nevertheless, with and without leniency firms may pick the unconstrained
ν̄N , so that leniency has no effect on collusion.
The result that ν∗N > 0 is of course driven by our assumption that the
fine νF is proportional to the degree of collusion. We are not aware of any
legal system where this is not the case in one form or the other. For example,
in Switzerland the fine is a percentage (up to 10%) of the revenue made in
Switzerland in the last 3 years. The actual percentage is adjusted for the
severity of collusion (horizontal price-fixing is most severe offense), whether
the firms cooperated during the investigation etc. The revenue should be
positively correlated with the degree of collusion, thus so is the fine. Ac-
cordingly, our assumption that the fine goes up with the degree of collusion
seems a reasonable approximation for Swiss institutions. Note that even with
a constant fine the result continues to hold if p′(0) = 0 which is, e.g., the
case for p(ν) = νβ, β > 1. Obviously, the result ν∗N > 0 is not true if we
restrict ν ∈ {0, 1}.
In our framework the AA chooses the probability of an investigation α.
Suppose, for example, to investigate an industry the AA needs a certain
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amount of manpower. By choosing the overall size of its staff, the AA deter-
mines the fraction α of industries it can investigate. Each industry is equally
likely to be investigated, independently of its degree of collusion ν; ν only
plays a role for the probability of conviction p. It seems conceivable that α is
also an increasing function of ν: the more firms collude, the more suspicious
the industry, the more likely it is to be investigated. While such a set-up is
certainly of interest, it raises a couple of problems: Is ν more important for α
or for p? How does α depend on the efforts by the AA and the degree of col-
lusion ν?15 We have avoided these modeling issues by assuming separability:
the AA picks α while the firms strategically determines p.
5 Conclusions
In most of the existing literature on leniency firms have to decide between
colluding and not colluding, a binary choice. Yet, often firms have more
than two options as to collusion: they can, e.g., collude on some markets and
compete on the others or the can set any price between the competitive and
the monopoly one. The purpose of this paper is to study leniency programs
when firms choose the degree of collusion, a continuous variable. It turns out
that this affects the effectiveness of leniency programs. To asses leniency it
seems thus a good idea to keep the firms’ collusion possibilities in mind.
As to the introduction of leniency, our results are mixed. If the probability
of an investigation is small or if firms are sufficiently patient, leniency is
ineffective and may even increase collusion. In all other cases leniency may
or may not reduce collusion. Firms, choose, however, always a positive degree
of collusion. Complete deterrence is not possible in our framework.
15Abusing notation we could, e.g., use a contest function to define the probability of an
investigation as α/(α+ ν). With the same approach we could define p.
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